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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
ECHO NEY, TRUSTEE, 
WASATCH HOMES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
G. T. HARRISON and 
ALDA J. HARRISON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8437 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEJ\IENT OF FACTS 
This is an action to recover a real estate commission. 
The case arose out of the sale of certain real property 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, known as the Snow 
Apartments. 
On September 16, 1952, the defendants and respond-
ents were the joint owners of an equity in the Snow 
Apartments. On that date, or shortly thereafter, re-
spondents entered into an Earnest Money Agreement 
for the sale of this equity interest to one Einar Asp and 
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his wife. One Dean Perry, an agent of plaintiff and 
appellant Wasatch Homes, Inc., was instrumental in 
obtaining the signatures of respondents to the Earnest 
Money Agreement. (R. 114, 115) 
Dean Perry, either individually or in his capacity 
as agent of Wasatch Homes, Inc., was not a party to 
the Earnest Money Agreement. A listing contract was 
never signed between respondents, or either of them, 
and Wasatch Homes, Inc. (R. 114, 115) 
Subsequently, the Snow Apartments were sold to 
Einar Asp. The sale was later set aside by the Third 
_District Court because of the default of Asp. (R. 115) 
On November 12, 1953, appellants brought an action 
against the respondents for a real estate commission for 
the sale to Asp. It was alleged that Wasatch Homes, 
Inc., was entitled to a commission for procuring a pur-
chaser for the Snow Apartments, and that Wasatch 
Homes, Inc., had assigned its claim to Echo X ey, Trustee. 
(R. 1, 2) 
On December 9, 1953, a default was entered by the 
appellants against Aida J. Harrison, and on the same 
day the appellants obtained a default judgment against 
her for the entire amount claimed. (R. 3, 4) 
On Februan· 27, 1954, G. T. Harrison filed his 
answer to Appellants' Complaint. 
On Ort.ohcr 30, 1954, Aida J. Harrison made a mo-
tion, supported by her a:ffida\·it, to set aside the default 
and default judgment entered against her. (R. 15, 16) 
The motion was set for hearing. Counsel for both 
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appellants and respondents were present to argue the 
motion, but no evidence was offered beyond the affidavit 
of Mrs. Harrison. 
On November 15, 1954, the court entered an order 
setting aside the default and default judgment. (R. 17) 
On April 26, 1955, the cause was tried to the court 
on the Amended Complaint of the appellants, and on 
September 21, 1955, the court entered judgment in favor 
of the respondents, no cause of action. (R. 116) 
Appellants now appeal both from the order vacating 
the default and default judgment and also from the 
final judgment. 
The statement of points and argument will be 
divided into two sections. Section I will deal with the 
order vacating the default and default judgment; Sec-
tion II will concern the Final Judgment. 
SECTION I 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE SUPREME COURT CAN ONLY REVIEW 
THE FACTS PLACED BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDG-
MENT ENTERED AGAINST ALDA J. HAR-
RISON. 
2. WHETHER OR NOT TO VACATE THE DE-
FAULT AND DEFAULT tTUDGMENT ENTERED 
AGAINST ALDA J. HARRISON WAS WITHIN 
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. THE SUPREME COURT CAN ONLY REVIEW 
THE FACTS PLACED BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING 
ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDG-
MENT ENTERED AGAINST ALDA J. HAR-
RISON. 
In determining questions on appeal a reviewing 
court must decide the issues from the record that was 
before the trial court at the time of the error complained 
of. This is the rule followed in the overwhelming 
majority of the jurisdictions, including Utah. In 3 
American Juris prudence, Section 692, pages 284 and 285, 
the rule is stated as follows: 
"It is a well-settled rule of appellate procedure 
that all questions must be tried and determined 
by the record as certified to the appellate court. 
The record imports absolute verity and resort 
cannot be had to anything dehors the record for 
the purpose of contradicting it. (citations) In 
other words, the record is regarded as conclusive, 
(citations) and nothing can be assigned for error 
which contradicts the record. (citations) '' 
The same rule is applicable to interlocutory pro-
ceedings. In discussing the reYiew which an appellate 
court may make of such proceedings, -! Corpus Juris 
Secundum, Section 1160, pagP 1652, stat<.•s as follows: 
''The action of the trial court upon interlocutory 
proceedings will not be re,·iewed on appeal unless 
the record sets out the motion and ruling thereon, 
and such facts with regard to such proceedings 
<IS will enable the appellate court to determine the 
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correctness and propriety of the decision of the 
trial court. (citations)'' 
In this respect the Utah Supreme Court, in the case 
of United States Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Midvale 
Home Finance Corporation, et al.,. being case No. 5462 
as docketed in the Supreme Court, and reported in 46 
P. 2d 672, held that : 
''Jurisdiction of Supreme Court is limited to 
reviewing case made in court below, and Supreme 
Court cannot determine questions not within 
pleadings and not heard or determined by trial 
court.'' 
The order vacating the default and default judg-
ment against Alda J. Harrison was entered after notice 
and hearing. At the time of the hearing the only evidence 
presented to the court was the affidavit of Alda J. Har-
rison. Appellants' counsel was present at the hearing, 
but did not offer any counter affidavits or present any 
evidence for the consideration of the court. THE 
QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFAULT 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD OR SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED WAS NEVER AGAIN 
BEFORE THE COURT. 
The exhibits referred to by appellants in their brief 
were introduced after the hearing on the motion to 
vacate. They were introduced at the trial of the cause 
on the merits where the issue of the default and default 
judgment was not raised. The only issues raised at the 
trial of the cause went to the merits of the case. These 
exhibits cannot be used on appeal to prove error in 
vacating the default and default judgment when they 
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were not before the court when the order to vacate was 
entered. 
The only evidence which this court can consider in 
determining whether or not the lower court committed 
error in vacating the default and default judgment is the 
evidence which was before the court when the issue of 
the default and default judgment was raised. The only 
evidence before the court at that time was the affidavit 
of Aida J. Harrison. 
2. WHETHER OR NOT TO VACATE THE DE-
FAULT AND DEFAULT JUDG:JIENT ENTERED 
AGAINST ALDA J. HARRISON WAS WITHIN 
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT. 
The general policy of the law is that every man shall 
have his day in court. This policy has always been 
recognized by the Utah Courts, and our procedures have 
been formulated so that substantial justice may be 
encouraged and not obstructed by arbitrary rule. In the 
case of Utah Commercial Bank v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198, 
53 P. 1033, decided June 30, 1898, the court said, on 
pages 207 and 208 of the Utah Reports : 
''The power of the court to set aside judgments 
by default is recognized and conferred in section 
3005, R.S. Utah, and should be liberally exer-
cised, for the purpose of directing proceedings 
and h·ring causes upon their substantial merits; 
and where the circumstances which led to the 
default are such as to cause the court to hesitate, 
it is bPt tt)r to resolve the doubt in fayor of the 
application, so that a trial may be secured on the 
merits. 
• * * 
''No general rule can he laid down respecting the 
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discretion to be exercised in setting aside or re-
fusing to set aside a judgment by default. So it 
would be impossible to state what degree of negli-
gence would justify the court in refusing relief 
in all such cases. Each case must necessarily de-
pend upon its own peculiar facts and circum-
stances, but the discretion should always be so 
exercised as to promote the ends of justice.'' 
Utah has now adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
These rules continue the policy of seeking substantial 
justice between litigants and leave to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court whether or not to set aside and 
vacate default judgments. Rule 35(c), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provides as follows : 
''Setting Aside Default. For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, 
if a judgment by default has been entered, may 
likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 
60(b ). " 
Rule 60 (b) provides a number of reasons which will 
justify a court in vacating and setting aside a judgment, 
and clearly indicates that the judge may exercise his 
sound discretion in the rna tter. Subsection ( 7) of Rule 
60(b) provides that in addition to the reasons named 
a judgment may be set aside for 
''any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment.'' 
Under the provisions of these rules the holdings 
have consistently been that the trial court could vaeate 
or refuse to vacate a default judgment at the exercise 
of his sound discretion. Such was the holding of Warren 
c. Di:run Rauch Co., 260 P. 2d 741, which stated that: 
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"Though an equity court no longer has complete 
discretion in granting or denying motion to vacate 
judgment, it may exercise wide judicial discretion 
in weighing the factors of fairness and public 
convenience, and Supreme Court on appeal will 
reverse trial court only where an abuse of such 
discretion is clearly shown.'' 
In the matter of the discretion which may be exer-
cised by the trial court see also: Salt Lake Hardware Co. 
v. Nielson Land and Water Co., 43 Utah 406, 134 P. 911; 
McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293,104 P. 731; Cutler 
v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897; Nounnan v. Toponee, 
1 Utah 168; Aaron v. Holmes, 35 Utah 49, 99 P. 450. 
As heretofore stated, the only evidence before the 
court at the hearing to set aside and vacate the default 
and default judgment was the affidavit of Alda J. Har-
rison. This affidavit set forth the following facts: 
1. That Alda J. Harrison was divorced from 
respondent G. T. Harrison on :May 11, 1953. 
2. That the divorce decree in that action ordered 
G. T. Harrison to pay all commissions or costs 
which might arise in relation to the Snow 
Apartments. 
3. That she believed that the divorce decree com-
pletely protected her from any action in con-
nection with the Snow Apartments. 
4. That she belieYed that by reason of the decree 
G. rr. Harrison, alone, would be responsible for 
aur claims arising from the sale of the Snow 
Apa rtmcnt::;;. 
6. rrlwt slw had no notire of judgment or of any 
court proceedings until she rereiYed a notice 
of ga rll i RhmL'll t pro reedings. 
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6. That she did not willfully or intentionally 
ignore the summons and complaint with the 
intent of allowing the default and default 
judgment to be entered. 
7. That she desired to enter an appearance in the 
action and to file an answer to the complaint. 
(R. 16.) 
It is submitted that the affidavit presented sufficient 
facts to permit the trial court, in the exercise of its sound 
discretion, to vacate and set aside the default and default 
judgment. As was stated in the Utah Commercial Bank 
case, supra: 
''Each case must necessarily depend upon its own 
peculiar facts and circumstances, but the discre-
tion should always be so exercised as to promote 
the ends of justice.'' 
The case has now been tried on the merits. In that 
trial the court held that appellants had no cause of 
action against Aida J. Harrison. If this court were to 
reinstate the vacated default judgment the ends of jus-
tice would certainly not be served. Appellants would 
then have a default judgment against Aida J. Harrison 
when the trial court, in a trial on the merits, has held 
that no cause of action existed against her. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
By James L. Barker, Jr. 
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SECTION II 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
NO CONTRACT BETWEEN WASATCH HOMES, 
INC., AND RESPONDENTS. 
ARGUMENT 
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
NO CONTRACT BETWEEN WASATCH HOMES, 
INC., AND RESPONDENTS. 
The trial court, in its Findings of Fact, found that 
the only contracts which were entered into by the re-
spondents involving the sale of the Snow Apartments 
were an Earnest Money Agreement and a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract and that the only other parties to these 
contracts were Einar Asp and his wife. The court 
specifically found that ''there is no admissible evidence 
as to the existence of a listing contract between either 
G. T. Harrison or Aida J. Harrison and Wasatch Homes, 
Inc." (Finding No. 5), and that Dean Perry "either in 
his own capacity or as an agent of Wasatch Homes, Inc., 
was not a part~y to the Earnest Money Agreement.'' 
(Finding No. 6) (R. 114, 115) 
In its conclusions of law the trial court held that 
neither the above. mentioned Earnest Money Agreement 
nor the Uniform Heal Estate Contract between the 
Hc~pondents and the Asps constituted a contract between 
Hespondents, or either of them, and \Yasatch Homes, 
fne. (Conclusions 1, 2, 3, 4) (H. 115) 
It is a fundamental principle of law that contracts 
10 
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involving the sale of real estate, to be enforcible, must 
be in writing. Also, an agreement employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate, to be enforcible, 
must be in writing. This is clearly set forth in the Statute 
of Frauds, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 25-5-4, 
subdivision ( 5) : 
''In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: 
"* * * 
'' (5) Every agreement authorizing or employing 
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate 
for compensation.'' 
The decisions under this provision of the code 
clearly indicate that an express oral contract to pay com-
missions to a real estate broker will not support a re-
covery unless there is an express contract in writing 
authorizing the broker to make the sale. Annotated 
under the above code provision is the case of Case v. 
Ralph, 5-6 Utah 243, 188 P. 640, which held that: 
"Under Comp. Laws 1917, Section 5817, requiring 
agreements authorizing brokers to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation to be in writing, 
an express agreement to pay commissions will 
not support a recovery if there is no express con-
tract authorizing the broker to make the sale." 
and on page 641 of the Pacific citation the court states: 
"In view of our statute of frauds and the authori-
ties hereinafter referred to, the only matters that 
ean be considered by us arise upon the first cause 
of action, set forth in the complaint. The con-
11 
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trolling question therefore is : Does the complaint 
state a cause of action~ 
"Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 5817, so far as 
rna terial here, provides : 
'' 'In the following cases every agreement shall 
be void, unless such agreement or some note or 
memorandum thereof be in writing and subscribed 
by the party to be charged therewith: * * * (5) 
Every agreement authorizing or employing an 
agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation or a commission.' '' 
The court then cites a list of authorities in support 
of this proposition. 
In the present controversy there was absolutely no 
written agreement between the Harrisons, or either of 
them, and Wasatch Homes, Inc. Nor was there any 
memorandum of any such agreement. As stated above, 
the only agreements presented to the trial court were 
agreements between the Harrisons and the Asps, agree-
ments to which Wasatch Homes, Inc., was not a party. 
The appellants, through random selection of state-
ments in eYidence, contend that there was a parol agree-
ment between :!\Irs. Harrison and Dean Perry involving 
the sale of the Snow Apartments. EYen were this true, 
a parol agn•ement "'ill not support a recoYery for a 
commission for the sale of real property. To this effect 
we eall the court's attention to the cases of 8 mith Realty 
Oom Jwny c. Dipietro, et u:r, 77 Utah 176, ~92 P. 915, and 
Van Lee111twn r. llujf'akcr, 78 Utah 321, 5 P. 2d 714, both 
of whieh SJwcitical1~· hold that a broker must both allege 
and proV<' au express coutract of employment as a basis 
12 
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of a broker's action to recover commissions, and that the 
document or documents transferring or purporting to 
transfer the properties between the buyer and seller are 
not a sufficient agreement to take the matter out of the 
statute of frauds. 
CONCLUSION 
The court having found no express contract between 
either of the respondents and Wasatch Homes, Inc., or 
between either of the respondents and Dean Parry as 
agent of Wasatch Homes, Inc., and having further found 
that the earnest money agreement entered into between 
the respondents and one Einar Asp and his wife did not 
constitute a contract between the respondents or either 
of them and Wasatch Homes, Inc., respondents submit 
that the decision of the trial court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR. 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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